PERSONALITIES A N D POLICIES
Although foreign policy is often the product of the complex interplay between domestic politics and international developments -or, as some would have it, 'structural determinants' 4 -it is still shaped and influ enced by people. It is therefore important to understand in broad terms some of the attitudes and approaches of those w h o shaped foreign pol icy within the North Atlantic triangle during the 1920s. For most of the war and the early postwar period American policy w a s in the hands of Woodrow Wilson, Democratic president from 1 9 1 3 to 1 9 2 1 . Wilson's basic aim w a s to create w h a t has often been referred to as a l i b e r a l inter nationalist' w o r l d order based on the concepts of freer trade, open diplo macy, and national self-determination. A l l of these aims w e r e embodied in the League of Nations organization created at the end of the Great War. For various reasons, about which historians still disagree, 5 the Wilsonian vision w a s rejected by the U.S. Senate and this defeat paved the w a y for the so-called Republican A s c e n d a n c y during the 1920s. 6 That ascendancy began with the election of Warren Harding in 1 9 2 0 and continued under the administrations of C a l v i n C o o l i d g e and then Herbert Hoover, w h o served from 1928 until his defeat b y Franklin Roosevelt and the Democrats in 1 9 3 2 . For much of this period the presi dent did not exercise as much control over foreign policy as other m e m bers of the cabinet, most notably Charles E v a n s H u g h e s , secretary of state under Harding and Coolidge; A n d r e w Mellon, w h o s e r v e d as Trea sury secretary under all three Republican presidents; and Herbert Hoover, w h o exerted a powerful influence at C o m m e r c e until a s s u m i n g office. Traditionally, historians h a v e v i e w e d the Republican era as the American retreat into political isolationism. 7 The rejection of Wilson's internationalist approach taught Republican leaders to p a y more atten tion to domestic opinion, especially as it w a s reflected in the Senate, and to shape policy accordingly. Hence, A m e r i c a n leaders turned inward. While it is true that the United States did not join the L e a g u e of Nations and generally withdrew politically from international affairs, the country was far from detached. 8 After all, it participated in three major disarma ment conferences, co-sponsored the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing w a r , and, through the D a w e s and Y o u n g plans, lent its efforts to ease eco nomic and financial problems in Europe. These forays into international diplomacy represented t w o significant aims in A m e r i c a n foreign policy: promoting peace through European and American economic well-being and preventing the United States from being d r a w n into another major European w a r .
In the light of those general aims, other American goals seem some w h a t contradictory. The United States sought to expand economically and pursued naval equality, if not superiority, over Great Britain.' Amer ican economic expansion has given rise to suspicions that policy w a s being directed by the business elite.'" The reality w a s not that s i m p l e . " The State Department, for example, often disagreed with Commerce, and various bodies in the United States stood against the 'big naval' lobby in Washington. Thus, although the predominant tendency of the United States w a s to t u m inward politically and avoid international commit ments while seeking to increase economic and military power, there w a s a fisstparous quality to American foreign policy that led to certain misperceptions about the direction in which the United States w a s moving. This misunderstanding w a s particularly true in Great Britain." The divisions aside, the British sought to achieve two basic aims dur ing the 1920s. One w a s to preserve the European balance of p o w e r ; the other w a s to maintain and defend the empire. For much of the postwar decade Britain concentrated on European affairs, particularly on the need to satisfy France's demand for security against a resurgent Ger m a n y in the aftermath of the American refusal to join the L e a g u e of Nations. This is not to say that Britain neglected its empire. A s a l w a y s , British strength lay in the continued existence of a unified empire; but in seeking to fulfil this goal the British frequently locked horns with the autonomy-minded Canadians.
If the 1920s were years of the Republican ascendancy in the United States and largely Conservative domination in Britain, in C a n a d a they marked the beginning of the Liberal ascendancy. 1 5 The Conservatives, led by Robert Borden -Sir Robert after 1 9 1 4 -had been in p o w e r since 1 9 1 1 . The 1 9 1 7 federal election produced a Union government headed by Borden. After ill health forced Borden to retire in 1920, Arthur Meighen led the party until his defeat at the hands of William L y o n Mackenzie King and the Liberals in 1 9 2 1 . Except for a brief hiatus in 1926, King dominated Canadian politics and foreign policy throughout the 1920s -in fact, excepting the period from 1930 to 1935, he dominated Canadian policy from 1 9 2 1 to 1 9 4 8 . 1 6 Emphasizing the role of the prime minister in the making of Canadian foreign policy -or 'external affairs' in the Canadian lexicon -is no mistake. From 1 9 1 2 to 1946 all C a n a d i a n prime minsters served as their o w n secretary of state for external affairs. Of course there w e r e others w h o influenced the direction of foreign pol icy: for example, N e w t o n Rowell, a Liberal politician w h o joined Bor den's Union government and w h o s e interest in Canada's international position almost exceeded that of the prime minister. Under K i n g there w e r e a number of notable personalities, including Ernest Lapointe, the French-Canadian justice minister, w h o supported the L e a g u e of Nations, and J.L. Ralston, the minister of national defence. Others w h o deserve mention are Walter Hose, the director of the Canadian N a v a l Services, w h o s e contribution and influence has been only recently recog nized; 1 7 J.S. Ewart, a l a w y e r and constitutional expert w h o acted as an unofficial adviser to King during the 1920s; and J.W. Dafoe, the editor of what used to be the best n e w s p a p e r in Canada, the Manitoba Free Press. But the most remarkable protagonists w e r e Loring Christie and O.D. Skelton of the Department of External Affairs. 1 8 Christie cuts a fascinating and rather tragic figure in Canadian his tory. H e served as legal adviser under Borden and Meighen and, though he believed that C a n a d a w o u l d eventually h a v e to a s s u m e control o v e r foreign policy, he shared Borden's notion of an imperial federation in which the dominions w o u l d h a v e a say in the formulation of empire policy.' 9 This idea did not endear him to King and he w a s eased out in 1923. (He returned in 1 9 3 5 a confirmed anti-imperial isolationist.) Christie's place as a k e y adviser w a s taken by Skelton, a former univer sity professor, w h o became under-secretary of state for external affairs in 1 9 2 5 and K i n g ' s most trusted adviser. Skelton w a s anti-imperialist and neutralist -if not isolationist -from the start, and he fought hard for Canadian independence throughout his career. 2 0 A l t h o u g h Borden, Meighen, and K i n g -and Christie and Skelton -m a y h a v e differed o v e r means, they shared a common goal: the advancement of Canadian autonomy, the promotion of good Anglo-American relations, and grow ing disenchantment with the League of Nations. Borden and Meighen paid a great deal of lip service to the empire, but it w a s initially under their policies, not K i n g ' s , that C a n a d a began to m o v e a w a y from Britain and towards the United States. 2 1 King certainly carried the fight through the 1920s and beyond. Under his leadership Canadians became used to hearing the slogans 'no commitments' and 'Parliament will decide' as the country began to w i t h d r a w from European and imperial commit ments.
Within the North Atlantic triangle, then, there w e r e three broad cur rents. One w a s the gradual Canadian and A m e r i c a n w i t h d r a w a l from international commitments. The second w a s A m e r i c a n economic expan sion and its effect on Canadian-American and A n g l o -A m e r i c a n rela tions. T h e third w a s the g r o w i n g A n g l o -A m e r i c a n naval rivalry and its impact on C a n a d a ' s position in the triangle. These developments did not happen overnight; rather, there w a s a slow evolutionary change that resulted from separate responses to the n e w international and domestic conditions each member of the triangle faced after the Great War.
THE PEACE A N D THE LEAGUE
Perhaps even more than its triangle allies, Canadian attitudes towards the postwar era w e r e moulded by the charnel house of the Great War which had m a i m e d and slaughtered the flower of C a n a d i a n youth. 'It was European policy, European statesmanship, European ambition, that drenched this w o r l d in blood and from which w e are still suffering and will suffer for generations/ charged the Canadian delegate, N e w t o n Rowell, at the inaugural gathering of the L e a g u e of Nations in 1920. ' To m a n y Canadians, the nascent League of Nations -the brainchild of President W o o d r o w Wilson -symbolized a perilous affiliation. C a n a d a had successfully lobbied at the Paris Peace Conference of 1 9 1 9 to join the world b o d y as a separate member. Yet this c a m p a i g n had been based more on the ambition to see the dominion's status and voice as an auton omous nation a c k n o w l e d g e d than on any heartfelt belief in the princi ples of collective security. 2 4 From the point of v i e w of most Canadians the L e a g u e w a s simply an instrument for European nations to manipu late in resolving private quarrels that in no w a y touched Canada. Clif ford Sifton, the proprietor of the Manitoba Free Press a n d a former cabinet minister, w a r n e d that C a n a d a ' s continued membership w o u l d 'do us no good and m a y possibly get us into trouble.' Sifton spoke for m a n y Cana dians w h e n he asserted that the main aim of the 'people over there' w a s to ensnare Canadians in 'European and Imperialistic complications.' 2 5 Small w o n d e r that successive Canadian governments strove first to delete and, w h e n that failed, to a m e n d substantially Article X of the League Covenant. This article, w h i c h Wilson termed 'the heart of the C o v e n a n t / p l e d g e d member states to come to the aid of any one of them w h o w a s the victim of an act of aggression. It w a s not a concept that appealed to m a n y Canadians, including Prime Minister Borden, w h o s e opposition carried an almost hysterical tone. Inclusion of the article, he said, 'might lead to great disorder, possibly rebellion on the Pacific Coast of the United States and C a n a d a . ' 2 6 Instead, the L e a g u e must be regarded solely as a b o d y that furnished the means to mediate, arbitrate, and adjudicate disputes. Christie argued that C a n a d a should w o r k towards 'a L e a g u e that is a method of diplomacy and is not an institution with fighting c o m p a c t s . ' 2 7 The message here w a s clear. The L e a g u e should p r o v i d e a forum for the discussion and debate of w o r l d affairs, but it should d o little more. Indeed, argued m a n y Canadians, C a n a d a ought to abandon the L e a g u e if it remained primarily fixated on Euro pean matters. The dominion should a l w a y s approach its 'obligations and interventions in regard to all regions of the earth in a sense compat ible with her geographical position.' 2 8 Projects designed to enlarge a n d fortify the collective security aspects of the League Covenant, such as the G e n e v a Protocol for the Pacific Set tlement of International Disputes -which called for compulsory arbitra tion and military or economic sanctions against aggressor states -had to be avoided at all costs. According to O.D. Skelton, C a n a d a w a s a country 'fortunate in its comparative isolation and its friendly neighbour.' It had nothing in common with European nations, 'heirs to centuries of feuds and fears.' 2 9 The Locarno Pact of 1925 w a s no better. By the terms of this treaty, France, Belgium, and G e r m a n y pledged to respect each other's borders and Britain and Italy guaranteed the arrangement. The renunci ation by G e r m a n y and France of any w i s h to alter their existing bound aries, coupled with an agreement to arbitrate disputes between them, w e r e certainly 'steps toward peace,' Skelton conceded, 'but they are Europe's steps, Europe's job and should rest for their enforcement upon the conduct of France and G e r m a n y , not upon intervention by a country four thousand miles a w a y . ' A Canadian endorsement of Locarno w o u l d pose too g r a v e a risk to the dominion, particularly given its racial com position, its proximity to the United States, and its millstone of w a r debt. 3 0 A l l in all, the prevailing sentiment in C a n a d a during the 1920s demanded that every effort be geared towards ensuring that Canadians We as Canadians have our destiny before us not in Continental Europe but here on the free soil of America. Our policy for the next hundred years should be that laid down by George Washington in the United States for the guidance of his country-men -absolute renunciation of interference in European affairs -and that laid down by the other great father of his country in Canada, Sir Wilfrid Laurier -'freedom from the vortex of European militarism' ... let Europe be the arbiter of its own destiny while we in Canada, turning our energies to our own affairs, undertake our own peaceful development. 3 3
That a Canadian should invoke the spirit of one of the founding fathers of the United States to argue the case for his o w n country's noninterventionism w a s no coincidence; for during the postwar decade many Americans w e r e m a k i n g strikingly similar arguments about the need to evade military and political commitments abroad.
Isolationist sentiment in the United States during the 1920s had m a n y standard-bearers but its main leadership undoubtedly came from the American Senate. 3 4 It w a s a point of v i e w first articulated in the battle w a g e d there in 1 9 1 8 -2 0 to prevent the country from joining the L e a g u e of Nations. There w e r e several arguments advanced against member ship that w e r e unique to A m e r i c a n sensibilities, 3 5 but certain of their essentials closely resembled Canadian attitudes. The L e a g u e of Nations was 'nothing but a mind cure' and a 'pipe dream,' suggested Senator Frank B r a n d e g e e . 3 6 Moreover, as far as the United States w a s concerned, Idaho's William Borah firmly believed, it w o u l d 'finally lead us all into all kinds of entangling obligations and conditions with E u r o p e a n affairs.' 3 7 Article X w o u l d see to that. Underwriting the territorial integ rity of every nation w h i c h comprised the L e a g u e w a s 'a v e r y g r a v e , a very perilous promise to make,' w a r n e d Wilson's bitter e n e m y and chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Henry Cabot Lodge: 'because there is but one w a y b y which such guarantees, if ever invoked, can be maintained, and that w a y is the w a y of force ... If w e guarantee any country on earth ... that guarantee w e must maintain at any cost w h e n our w o r d is once given, and w e must be in constant pos session of fleets and armies capable of enforcing these guarantees at a moment's notice.' 3 8 In the end, the Treaty of Versailles, along with the League of Nations, w a s rejected by the United States Senate in M a r c h 1920. H o w e v e r , that b o d y ' s isolationist v a n g u a r d remained ever vigilant for any other initiative that might similarly sacrifice their country's peace, prosperity, and independence on the altar of European or A s i a n ambitions and rivalries. A n inviting target soon appeared in the form of the Four Power Pact, one of the agreements arising out of the Washing ton Conference on n a v a l arms limitation of 1 9 2 1 -2 . The United States, Britain, Japan, and France agreed to respect each other's territorial rights in the Pacific, to refer disputes between them to a conference of all four nations, and to consult one another in the event of an outside attack against them. 3 9
For Senate isolationists the treaty w a s an armed alliance p u r e and sim ple through which the United States incurred dangerous obligations. It flew in the face of traditional American foreign policy, injected the republic into foreign squabbles unconnected with its o w n interests, and threatened its sovereignty in diplomatic affairs. Worst of all, it w o u l d one day drag the country into a w a r . 4 0 Senate opponents attacked the pact as a 'menacing little imitation league,' another example of 'the old hellish system w h o s e frightful story is told upon a thousand battlefields of the Old World.' If it w e r e ratified, 'American boys [would] again shed their blood on foreign fields.' 4 1 The Senate eventually passed the treaty, but not before its isolationist members succeeded in neutering it by attaching a reservation to American adherence that excluded any com mitment to armed force, an alliance, or the obligation to assist in defence against aggression. 4 2 The Senate also operated against other foreign pol icy initiatives such as American membership in the World Court. The Senate approved American membership in the court in 1926, but only after affixing several reservations. 4 3 Three years later isolationist Sena tors were similarly able to protect America's freedom of action and limit its international obligations by so qualifying the country's adhesion to the KeEogg-Briand Pact -which renounced w a r as an instrument of national policy -that it amounted to nothing more than 'an international k i s s . ' 4 4
One belief in particular underlay and unified American isolationist attitudes during the 1920s: that the decision of the United States to enter the Great War in 1 9 1 7 had been a mistake. This v i e w sprang from post w a r histories of the origins of the conflict by both European and A m e r i can writers that marshalled impressive evidence to support the thesis that not only had the G e r m a n s not been completely villainous or the Allies completely altruistic, but that perhaps the Allies rather than the Central Powers w e r e primarily culpable for the w a r . American revision ist historians condemned their country's intervention in the conflict on that basis in the hope that the s a m e error w o u l d not be made a g a i n . 4 5 Why, then, had the United States participated at all, if one side had been no more virtuous than the other, unless it had been duped? A l l the moral and selfless reasons for American intervention seemed to b e stripped bare. The revisionist interpretation w a s fuelled by the convic tion that the entire peace settlement w a s founded on a misconception, since it formally assigned G e r m a n y special responsibility for the con flict. In fact, there w a s much that American isolationists considered iniquitous about the Treaty of Versailles. In m a n y w a y s , w h e n it came to both the war-guilt question and the criticism of Versailles, they took their cue from European, and particularly British, opinion. 4 6 Indeed, the 'thesaurus' of American isolationists w a s British econo mist John M a y n a r d K e y n e s ' s The Economic Consequences of the Peace, pub-lished at the end of 1 9 1 9 . In a scathing critique, K e y n e s denounced the Versailles settlement as excessively severe towards G e r m a n y . He argued that its draconian reparations arrangements represented the triumph of political retribution over fiscal common sense. Rather than laying a solid foundation for peace, the treaty s o w e d the seeds of another w a r . 4 7 It was, Keynes reproached, 'one of the most outrageous acts of a cruel vic tor in civilised history' and w o u l d be the 'death sentence of m a n y mil lions of German men, w o m e n and children.' 4 8 The impact of Keynes's study of the peace conference w a s w i d e s p r e a d . 4 9 It w a s also immense, no more so than in his native Britain, w h e r e it soon became the rarely challenged v i e w of the majority. 'AH the phrases of the 1920's,' Martin Gilbert has observed, 'peaceful change, treaty revision, bringing Ger many back to her rightful place in Europe, obtaining equality for the former foe, appeasement,' could be traced to K e y n e s . 5 0 Even though Britain's geopolitical position w a s radically different from that of either Canada or the United States, this frame of mind closely approximated mainstream thinking in those two countries. One might h a v e expected that the island nation's proximity to the continent, coupled with its recent participation in the Great War, w o u l d h a v e erased any thoughts on the part of its inhabitants that they might be able to stand aloof from Europe. Instead Keynes's assault on the injustice and immorality of Ver sailles resulted in a guilty population unable to justify the peace and unwilling to enforce it. 5 1 From there it w a s but a small step to belief in the merits of 'splendid isolation.' B y the mid-i920s in Britain, the concept that 'if peace is to be obtained, it must be paid for by certain sacrifices, the assumption of cer tain obligations,' w a s , one observer noted at the time, greeted with 'gen uine bewilderment.' 5 2 In a n y event, the domestic situation precluded such an activist role. TVe cannot act alone as the. policeman of the world,' Bonar L a w announced in 1922, 'the financial and social condi tion of the country makes that i m p o s s i b l e . ' 5 3 'Imperial isolation' became the rallying cry of m a n y British conservatives: the repudiation of expan sionism in favour of strengthening the empire, the emphasizing of nationalism over internationalism, the resolve not to permit government policy to be beholden to any supranational institution, the desire to defend existing interests rather than to seek out n e w responsibilities. 5 4 Based on these considerations, being a member of the 'League of Notions' w a s tantamount, one conservative organ suggested, to 'expos ing England's throat to the assassin's knife.' 5 5 A t best, 'the average con servative thought of it as a forum in which disputes could be aired and, if all went well, settled,' one observer later commented. 'The League's function w a s not to do but to b e . ' 5 6 A t worst, m a n y on the right v i e w e d the organization with contempt and suspicion, scepticism and distrust, because of the threat they believed it posed to national sovereignty. 5 7 Imperial isolationism perhaps found its most vocal champion during the 1920s in the R o u n d Table movement 
Thus, given Canadian and A m e r i c a n attitudes towards that body, the group looked askance at the G e n e v a Protocol's plan to bolster the League's collective security powers. It perhaps m a d e sense as a pact between continental nations, but from Britain's perspective, agreeing to support compulsory arbitration and automatic sanctions might seriously impair imperial and A n g l o -A m e r i c a n collaboration. The L e a g u e should confine its activities to fostering dialogue. The R o u n d Table' s assessment of Locarno w a s similar. O n the one hand, it welcomed this rapproche ment in the relationship between France and G e r m a n y as well as the treaty's limitation of Britain's continental commitment to western Europe. On the other, the g r o u p bemoaned even that obligation, not to mention the fact that, in assuming a responsibility that her dominions did not endorse, the mother country w a s imperilling the diplomatic unity of the e m p i r e . 6 0 British governments of the 1920s refused to adhere to the G e n e v a Protocol, signed the Locarno Pact comforted b y the fact that it actually diluted the nation's continental commitment and placed condi tions on British acceptance of the Kellogg-Briand Pact similar to those enacted by the American S e n a t e . 6 1 Thus, Anglo-American-Canadian diplomatic relations in the 1920s did not evolve in a v a c u u m but w e r e p l a y e d out against a backdrop of various domestic factors operating within all three countries. A n d a particular kind of collective ideological climate born of the Great W a r and w a r y of undertakings that might lead to a repetition of that ghastly experience helped to fuse the individual lines that comprised the North Atlantic triangle. Within it, h o w e v e r , there were differences of opinion over h o w best to achieve the goals of peace and security. One w a y for Britain to maintain its position w a s to promote just what the R o u n d Table sug gested: strong imperial unity and cordial A n g l o -A m e r i c a n relations. But Canada, the senior dominion, proved uncooperative and the United States hostile.
NORTH A M E R I C A N WITHDRAWAL
For most of his career Robert Borden championed the British Empire and promoted the idea of a cooperative imperial commonwealth. Bor den believed that through a process of continuous consultation between London and the self-governing dominions, Britain could establish a strong and unified foreign policy for the e m p i r e . 6 3 This goal been achieved, in part, at the Imperial War Conference of 1 9 1 7 , w h e n Borden and Jan Smuts of South Africa pushed through Resolution IX. It declared that Britain 'should recognise the right of the Dominions and India to an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign relations, and should provide effective arrangements for continuous consultation in all important matters of common Imperial concern.' 6 4 A t the time Borden hailed this resolution as a major step -but in which direction? Borden himself w a s not sure. In one breath he told the Canadian H o u s e of C o m m o n s in 1 9 1 7 that Resolution IX d i d 'not sacrifice in the slightest degree the autonomy of the p o w e r of selfg o v e r n m e n f in Canada; in the next he alluded to the 'opportunity for consultation, co-operation and united action' between C a n a d a and Brit a i n 6 ' If Borden still believed that Canadian autonomy could be squared with a unified imperial foreign policy throughout 1 9 1 8 , he w a s beginning to change his v i e w by the end of the w a r . The first indi cation came at meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet during the sum mer of 1 9 1 8 w h e n he launched a scathing attack on the conduct of the w a r and w a r n e d British leaders that unless C a n a d a could h a v e a 'voice in the foreign relations of the empire as a whole, she w o u l d before long have an independent voice in her own foreign affairs outside the empire.'* 6 Although the British worked hard to secure Canadian representation at the Paris Peace Conference, they had no intention of permitting Can ada a full voice in imperial affairs. Lloyd George was willing to allow full Canadian participation in a series of preliminary inter-Allied confer ences, but little more. 6 'regarded by the people as an alliance between Great Britain a n d J a p a n against the United States.' 7 2 Against this background of mounting tension A r t h u r M e i g h e n travelled to L o n d o n to attend the 1 9 2 1 Imperial Conference. H e w e n t with one aim: to m a k e sure the British did not renew the alliance. 7 3 A r g u i n g that the renewal of the alliance w o u l d h a v e a disastrous effect on Canadian-American relations, Meighen threatened to dissociate C a n ada from any British attempt to form an alliance with J a p a n . 7 4 His rea soning is instructive. 'If w e n o w in this state of affairs r e n e w a confidential and exclusive relationship with J a p a n / he told delegates at the Imperial Conference, 'it is w h o l l y impossible to argue convincingly, to m y mind, that it is not going to affect detrimentally our relations w i t h the United States, no matter h o w steadfastly the British G o v e r n m e n t sets its face to keep those relations g o o d . ' 7 5 C a n a d a thus urgently and suc cessfully helped to pressure Britain to end the alliance. It w a s replaced by a series of agreements reached at the Washington Conference of 1 9 2 1 -2 , the most important of which w a s the Five P o w e r Treaty limiting a tonnage ratio for capital ships -warships over 10,000 tons carrying guns larger than eight inches. The ratio w a s 5:5:3:1.75:1. 75 for, respec tively, Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy. Borden w a s called out of retirement to represent C a n a d a at the conference.
That the Americans had been urging C a n a d a to oppose the alliance cannot be doubted -Root, for example, did so in the belief that the termination of the alliance a n d British acceptance of the Washington treaties w o u l d make Britain more dependent on A m e r i c a n s u p p o r t . 7 6 Nevertheless, Meighen and Borden believed that they had demonstrated two things during the Imperial and Washington conferences. O n e w a s that Canada could act as a linchpin between Britain and the United States. The other w a s that the Imperial Conference had demonstrated the viability of a unified imperial foreign policy based on consultation. In reality, h o w e v e r , they had acted in the self-interest of C a n a d a , and in so doing they had succeeded in knocking out the foundation of British policy in the Far East, demonstrated that if forced to choose between Britain and the United States C a n a d a w o u l d choose the United States, and instilled in the British a distaste for future adventures in cooperative commonwealth experiments. In this sense they p a v e d the w a y for King.
King's role has been misunderstood, an error that is understandable, since his policies generally had an opaque quality. Thus he has been v a r iously portrayed as the great Canadian w h o single-handedly battled the British for Canadian autonomy or as the demon w h o broke the British connection and led C a n a d a into the arms of the United States or as the crafty statesman w h o reversed the policies of Borden and M e i g h e n . 7 7 The 'truth' -if it can be said to exist in history -probably lies some w h e r e between these conflicting v i e w s . K i n g d i d not so m u c h reverse policy as follow w h a t Borden had started to its logical conclusion. H e w a s undoubtedly a Canadian nationalist w h o sought autonomy, but he did not favour breaking the imperial tie. H e favoured closer relations with the United States, but not too close. A s one A m e r i c a n observer later pointed out: C a n a d a 'wished to get all the benefits out of the protection afforded her by geography, b y membership in the British Empire, and by friendship with the United States without assuming any responsibili ties.' 7 8 That m a y be the definitive statement of C a n a d i a n foreign policy in the interwar years. K i n g w a s not long in demonstrating w h e r e he stood on the question of Canadian autonomy. In September 1 9 2 2 the British government asked each of the dominions for assistance in confronting a Turkish threat to Britain's garrison at Chanak, on the banks of the Dardanelles in Asia Minor. O w i n g to sloppy practices, the uncoded cable communicating this request reached Canadian n e w s p a p e r offices before the government w a s a w a r e of the appeal. King first learned of its contents from a news paper reporter. Ottawa took no action. A n irate K i n g politely but stiffly notified the British that only the Canadian Parliament could decide what course the country w o u l d follow -and he had no intention of calling Parliament into session. 7 9 The Chanak crisis w a s instructive for m a n y Canadians. Meighen's attempt to embarrass K i n g with his 'Ready, aye, ready' speech did not succeed. For if it w a s true that European states manship had catapulted the w o r l d headlong into the Great War, it w a s equally true that British statesmen w e r e European. A n d if bungling Brit ish diplomats had helped to plunge the w o r l d into a devastating fouryear holocaust, so had the peculiar nature of the dominion's relationship to Britain automatically m a d e it a party to the conflict. That ruinous experience, compounded n o w by the irksome circumstances surround ing Chanak, served during the first decade of peace to strengthen the unsettling k n o w l e d g e that Canadians w e r e not in control of starting the engine of w a r . C a n a d a ' s ties with the mother country w e r e quite capable of d r a w i n g the dominion into hostilities not of its o w n interest or mak ing. C a n a d a did not yet exercise full authority o v e r the making of w a r and peace. The dominion could determine the nature and extent of its participation in British wars, but it w a s automatically a belligerent the moment Britain w a s one. This lesson, of course, w a s not lost on King, and he certainly inflicted a further dent in the concept of a unified policy for the empire at the Imperial Conference of 1923. There, he nipped in the bud any talk of continuous consultation, coordination of defence policies, and commit ments in advance to support British foreign policy. There, too, the dominions' right to sign their o w n treaties with other countries w a s enshrined. 8 " Nevertheless, the prospect of joint diplomatic action with London remained a powerful bogey for m a n y Canadians throughout the 1920s. J.S. Ewart, for example, a close friend of King, suggested that it w a s doubtful whether Britain really desired sincerely to confer with Canada. 'We understand y o u perfectly,' he wrote in a book intended for British as well as Canadian eyes, 'France wants to be able to call blacks and browns from Africa; and you want to be able to s u m m o n whites from Canada to fight blacks, browns, or other whites as y o u m a y think your interests require.' 8 '
Thus the Locarno Pact, about which London had not consulted Ottawa, which appeared between two general elections in C a n a d a , w a s a disturbing development. 'We cannot admit [that w e are] automatically committed to all Britain's wars,' Skelton maintained. 'Canada can best decide on her course in the light of the facts and circumstances of the time, rather than give a blank cheque now to whatever men m a y be in power in London in 1940; their case will be more circumspect if (they are] not sure of our support in a d v a n c e . ' 8 2 For Christie, Locarno had to be the parting of company with Britain. 'I cannot escape the conviction,' he wrote to Borden in February 1926, 'that... in order to play our unique part in the English-speaking world w e must assume a more indepen dent and detached position than existing forms allow u s . ' 8 ' That goal was achieved in large measure at the 1926 Imperial Conference, which produced the Balfour Declaration proclaiming that the dominions and Britain were 'in no w a y subordinate to one another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the C r o w n and freely associated as members of the British C o m m o n wealth of Nations.' The conference also agreed that the dominions could not 'be committed to the acceptance of active obligations, except with the definite consent of their o w n governments.'** Although there were those w h o grumbled that the Balfour Declara tion did not provide enough freedom from D o w n i n g Street, it w a s nevertheless a significant shift a w a y from Britain. On the one hand, J.S. Ewart observed in 1927 regarding the Canadian outlook: 'antipathy toward Americans has decreased, and is n o w tending to disappear ... making impossible the perpetuation of a Canadian felling of antagonism to the United States'. 8 5 On the other, 'there is an increasing disinclination to participate actively in British w a r s merely because they are British.' Many believed that C a n a d a ' s future lay in North America and the nur turing of relations with the United States. After all, as Christie pointed out, it w a s 'a simple truth of geography and history that Canadians are North American and not E u r o p e a n . ' 8 6 So far as Skelton w a s concerned, Canada's future lay 'in her o w n reasonableness, the decency of her neighbour, and the steady development of friendly intercourse, com mon standards of conduct, and common points of v i e w . ' 8 7 In the light of this attitude it w a s of no small consequence that Canadian autonomy w a s first demonstrated by the establishment of diplomatic missions, in Washington in 1 9 2 6 followed b y Paris in 1928 and T o k y o a y e a r later. British recognition of that autonomy occurred in 1928 with the appoint ment of a high commissioner to O t t a w a . 8 8 A s King prepared to g o to Paris to sign the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1929, he reflected proudly on his achievements in foreign policy: T a m convinced the period of m y admin istration will live in this particular as an epoch in the history of C a n a d a that w a s formative and m e m o r a b l e . ' 8 9 Indeed it w a s , but another epoch in Canadian history in the making w a s the economic shift towards the United States.
THE ECONOMIC SHIFT
The Great War's enormous impact on the international economy inevita bly affected economic relations within the North Atlantic triangle. In the pre-war era Great Britain had functioned as the commercial and eco nomic centre of the w o r l d . The w a r dealt a serious b l o w to sterling and Britain's pre-eminent economic position. The g a p thus created w a s to a large degree filled b y the United States. During the 1920s A m e r i c a rose to a nearly c o m m a n d i n g position as the international financial centre. A debtor nation b y nearly $4 billion in 1 9 1 4 , the United States emerged from the w a r a net creditor to the tune of about $ 1 0 billion. B y 1 9 2 2 this figure had risen to some $ 1 7 billion. Other indicators of A m e r i c a ' s n e w position are equally telling. In 1900, for example, the United States held roughly 3 per cent of the w o r l d ' s long-term investments; b y 1929 it held more than 30 per cent. Between 1 9 2 0 and 1929 American private inves tors lent more than $7.5 billion to foreign b o r r o w e r s . 9 0 B y contrast, Britain emerged from the w a r in a w e a k e n e d and precari ous state. The nation faced declining trade, unemployment that ran to nearly 1 8 per cent in the early 1920s, shrinking gold reserves, and, at least initially, g r o w i n g public unrest in the form of strikes. 9 1 A b o v e all, Britain w a s in debt, and in debt to the United States to the tune of about $4.7 billion. British hopes for the cancellation of w a r debts, h o w e v e r , were dashed. The Americans p r o v e d unwilling to cancel, and this reluc tance g a v e rise to the notion that the United States wanted to exert eco nomic dominance over Britain. T h e central ambition of ... American politicians/ the British ambassador, A u c k l a n d G e d d e s , informed his government in 1920, 'is to w i n for America the position of leading nation in the w o r l d and also leader among the English-speaking nations. To do this they intend to have the strongest n a v y and the largest mercantile marine. They intend also to prevent us from p a y i n g our debt b y sending goods to America and they look for the opportunity to treat us as a vas sal State so long as the debt remains u n p a i d . ' 9 2 B y the mid-i920s there was considerable bad feeling in Britain. 'The debts and similar claims on the part of the United States h a v e already m a d e the average Englishman think the Americans are dirty s w i n e / wrote a senior Foreign Office official. 9 3
There is little evidence to suggest that the United States wanted to reduce Britain to a vassal state, as Hughes w a s well aware: 'There will be no permanent peace unless economic satisfactions are enjoyed.' 9 4 Rather, as Frank Costigliola has pointed out, both Britain and the United States wanted to reconstruct the international economy, but each wanted to do so on terms that w o u l d fulfil its o w n national interests. For the United States it meant an international economy based on the con cept of the free market-place, the open door, and a return to the gold standard. For Britain it meant a London-centred financial bloc, reduced w a r debts, stabilized prices, and internationally regulated capital f l o w s . 9 5 Possessing more economic clout, the A m e r i c a n s w o n the battle during the 1 9 2 0 s . 9 6 Indications that the United States w o n the d a y w e r e apparent in a shift in trade and investment patterns within the North Atlantic triangle, particularly with respect to Canada.
Prior to the Great War C a n a d a had balanced its imports from the United States through exports to Britain. The United States accounted for an average of 60 per cent of all the goods C a n a d a imported w h i l e Britain accounted for an average of 53 per cent of all the goods C a n a d a exported between 1900 and 1 9 1 4 . During those same years C a n a d a imported only 23 per cent of its goods from Britain and exported 36 per cent of all its goods to the United States. A s these figures suggest, in the pre-war era the vast bulk of Canadian trade w a s carried out within the North Atlantic triangle -83 per cent of all import and 89 per cent of all export trade w a s with the United States and Britain. 9 7 The w a r signifi cantly affected these trade patterns. During the 1920s Canadian imports from the United States rose from an average of 60 per cent to 68 per cent; exports to Britain declined from an average of 53 per cent to 36 per cent. During the 1920s there w a s also a further decline in imports, from Brit ain to 16.5 per cent of total imports, while exports to the United States rose to an average of 39 per cent for the decade. In terms of overall trade, 84.5 per cent of C a n a d i a n import trade and 75 per cent of export trade w e r e done with Britain and the United States. Clearly, the most signifi cant development w a s the decline in Canadian trade, especially export trade, with Britain and the increasing trade with the United States. In fact, in 1 9 2 1 C a n a d a exported m o r e to other countries than it did to Brit ain -$312,845 million worth of goods w e r e exported to Britain, $333,995 million to 'other' countries. 9 8 This trend w o u l d continue throughout the decade, so that b y 1929 the total trade between C a n a d a and the United States ($1,372 billion) w a s larger than that of the total trade between Brit ain and the United States ( $ 1 , 1 7 8 billion). 9 9
Far more significant than the changing trade pattern w a s the dramatic shift in investment. In 1 9 1 3 British investment represented 75 per cent of the total foreign capital invested in Canada. Following the w a r that figure fell to 57 per cent and then declined steadily, so that b y 1 9 3 0 only 36 per cent of foreign investment in C a n a d a originated in Britain. A t the same time American investment in C a n a d a g r e w from a pre-war rate of 23 per cent of total investment to 36 per cent in 1 9 1 9 and then to 6 1 per cent in 1930. The turning point w a s 1 9 2 2 , when, for the first time, A m e r ican investment in C a n a d a exceeded British investment. 1 0 0 B y the mid-19203 total American investment had passed the $ 3 billion mark and continued at an annual rate of $ 2 . 5 million for the remainder of the d e c a d e . 1 0 1 This shift w a s of s o m e concern to the British, w h o w e r e w o r ried that increasing A m e r i c a n economic influence in C a n a d a posed a threat to the imperial link, if not to the empire itself. 'American m o n e y p o w e r is trying to get hold of the natural resources of the empire,' w a r n e d B a l d w i n in 1928. T h e y are w o r k i n g like b e a v e r s . ' 1 0 2 (The refer ence to C a n a d a ' s national emblem w a s probably unintended.) Britain did little to rectify the situation. Sterling remained w e a k through m u c h of the 1920s, and displeasure over losses suffered in railroad bankrupt cies tended to m a k e British investors shy of C a n a d a . 1 0 3 N o n e of the foregoing is to i m p l y that C a n a d a had jumped, or w a s willing to jump, into A m e r i c a ' s economic bed. There w e r e a number of ioo The North Atlantic Triangle problems in Canadian-American economic relations, most of them stem ming from the high-tariff policies the United States e m p l o y e d . More over, throughout the 1920s K i n g sought increased economic ties w i t h Britain, most notably at the 1 9 2 3 Imperial Economic C o n f e r e n c e . 1 0 4 Try ing to explain the aims of his budget at the end of the decade, K i n g wrote: 'It is essential to increase, not decrease, imports from Britain if w e wish to increase our exports to Britain, and the Budget ensures this b y diverting trade from the United States to B r i t a i n . A m e r i c a n n a v a l rivalry. The British official naval historian, Stephen Roskill, character ized the period from 1 9 1 9 to 1929 as 'the period of A n g l o -A m e r i c a n antagonism.' 1 0 7 B y the autumn of 1928 A n g l o -A m e r i c a n relations had so declined as a result of the naval issue that Robert Craigie, the head of the American Department of the Foreign Office, w a s writing that ' w a r is not unthinkable between the t w o countries.' 1 0 8
The immediate origins of the A n g l o -A m e r i c a n rivalry can be traced to the summer of 1 9 1 5 , w h e n the General Board of the United States N a v y recommended that 'the N a v y of the United States should ultimately be equal to the most powerful maintained b y any other nation of the w o r l d . ' 1 0 9 Thus w a s born the 'second to none' naval policy that the United States sought to initiate in the naval construction p r o g r a m s of 1 9 1 6 and 1 9 1 8 . A s it originally stood, the 1 9 1 8 program w a s to produce 1,000 ships, including t w e l v e battleships and sixteen battlecruisers. 1 1 0 Although the A m e r i c a n naval program w a s reduced to 1 5 6 ships after the w a r , in part because of the domestic opposition of the ' M u g w u m p ' factor and the National Council for the Limitation of Armaments, it nev ertheless caused considerable concern in Britain. 1 1 1 Churchill believed that there w a s an element of hluff and bluster' behind it, but he w a s not 'prepared to take dictation from the US.' 'We do not w i s h to put ourselves in the p o w e r of the United States/ he w a r n e d the cabinet. 1 1 2 This w a s an important consideration indeed, because the security and well-being of the empire depended u p o n a powerful n a v y , and in thenweakened financial situation the British had no desire to meet n e w chal lenges. A s Sir Ernie Chatfield, the first sea lord, later observed: 'We are in the remarkable position of not wanting to quarrel with a n y b o d y because w e have got most of the w o r l d already, or the best parts of it, and w e only want to keep w h a t w e h a v e got and prevent others taking it a w a y from u s . ' 1 1 3
The problem w a s h o w to accomplish the task. Despite the fact that Britain had emerged from the Great W a r with the w o r l d ' s largest n a v ysixty-one battleships, which w a s more than the A m e r i c a n and French navies combined, 1 2 0 cruisers, and 466 destroyers -it w a s becoming increasingly difficult to maintain that superiority. 1 1 4 Britain had been weakened by the w a r and faced the difficulty of trying to finance a large military machine to oversee empire commitments. The Royal N a v y alone s w a l l o w e d about £ 1 6 0 million, or 20 per cent of government expenditure in 1 9 1 9 -2 0 , at a time w h e n budget estimates w e r e shrink i n g . 1 1 5 In an effort to retrench, Britain w a s forced to abandon one of its long-standing policies: the T w o -P o w e r Standard.' A d o p t e d in 1889, this policy held that the Royal N a v y should be as strong as the combined might of any t w o p o w e r s . Unable to continue such a goal, Britain adopted the 'One-Power Standard' in 1920. The United States naval pro gram w a s therefore v i e w e d as a threat, or at least as a potential threat. 1 1 6
Although the Washington Conference settled some outstanding dif ferences in Anglo-American relations b y setting limits on capital ships, the treaties said nothing about cruisers. It w a s over the limitation of cruiser building that the next r o u n d began. Here the British enjoyed a decided advantage over the Americans and they wanted to keep it that w a y . When C o o l i d g e put forward a proposal in 1 9 2 4 to hold a second Washington conference to limit construction of smaller-class ships, the British refused. The Americans kept pressing, and in 1 9 2 7 the British agreed to attend the ill-fated C o o l i d g e conference, which met in G e n e v a during the summer. This Anglo-American naval rivalry concerned C a n a d a deeply for a number of reasons, chief of which w a s that C a n a d a a l w a y s suffered when Anglo-American relations soured -and a w a r w o u l d be an unmit igated disaster, since C a n a d a w o u l d likely be a battleground. This w a s , in fact, one of the arguments Meighen advanced at the 1 9 2 1 Imperial Conference. 1 2 0 Hence, during the 1920s and the 1930s C a n a d a repeatedly sought to promote g o o d Anglo-American relations. A s Walter Hose noted: 'We, w h o k n o w the U.S., should be in a position to g i v e advice which m a y prevent the British Cabinet being led into playing the U.S. Big N a v y Party's g a m e by the A d m i r a l t y . ' 1 2 1 Another Canadian concern rose from a general mistrust of the United States. C a n a d a w a s most cer tainly moving towards the United States in terms of trade and attitudes to Europe, but that trend did not extend to military matters. Walter Hose strongly warned against C a n a d a ' s 'placing itself entirely in the hands of the friendly n e i g h b o u r . In the end, of course, the United States and Britain did not g o to w a r . But the Anglo-American naval rivalry served to demonstrate the precar ious nature of the triangular relationship during the 1920s. M a n y of the problems that arose during the postwar decade w o u l d reappear during the 1930s -though there w o u l d be a different set of circumstances and, once again, different responses. Indeed, C a n a d a w o u l d once more join the mother country in w a r , again temporarily leaving the Americans behind on the sidelines. But it w a s the last gasp of an already altered tri angular relationship. The 1920s represented the beginning of a transition that w o u l d continue through the course of the twentieth century, and that w a s the gradual shift in p o w e r a w a y from Britain and towards the United States. For Canada, more than a n y other country, adaptation to the new order of things w a s imperative, controversial, and tumultuous. 
